The crisis in capitalism and the anarchist response

national | anti-capitalism | opinion/analysis Monday April 27, 2009 15:13 by WSM National Conference - Workers Solidarity Movement wsm_ireland at yahoo dot com

Two weeks back the Worker Solidarity Movement had its spring conference in Dublin at which the members debated and vote on the following position paper on the capitalist crisis. It moves from a a general description of the crisis at the global level, thought the specifics of Ireland and the resistance to date before looking at prospects for the future.

Section 1 - The crisis in capitalism, its causes, effects and 'recovery'

1.1 The crisis represents the collapse of the neo-liberal project which began in the 1970s. Neoliberalism aimed to remove as many restrictions on capital as possible, driven on one hand by the ideological belief that the "free-market" was the most efficient means of allocating investment, and on the other by the practical reality that those with wealth consider the fact that they should be allowed to do whatever the hell the want with it to be the first principle of natural justice.

1.2 The roots of the crisis can be said to lie in the same mechanisms that made possible the globalisation of capital over the last decades. This perspective is important because it means that instruments like Credit Default Swaps were not foolish scams but rather part of the oil keeping the machinery of global finance in motion. Their failure represents not just a huge loss of profit in the short term but also a fundamental break in the machine that kept globalisation functioning.

1.3 This crisis does not however mark the end of capitalism but merely brings to an end the neo-liberal phase of the capitalist project. Capitalism has been forced to re-trench and re-group but there is no evidence to suggest that it won't be able to do so successfully.

Section 2 - The crisis in the Republic of Ireland and what it means for sector by sector

2.1 For most of the 1990's and early 2000's the Republic of Ireland competed with Singapore for the title of 'most globalised economy'. What this meant in practice was that the Republic of Ireland oriented its economy towards offering services to the newly liberated international flows of capital. These services principally consisted of tax-arbitrage (i.e. offering lower corporate tax rates than the rest of the EU) and regulation-arbitrage (i.e. offering a regulation free zone in which capital flows could disappear into tax-havens and reappear as clean money).

2.2 The combination of a low/no tax economy, a practically regulation-free banking sector and a spectacular property speculation 'bubble' meant that the crash in the Republic of Ireland was much more sudden and severe than in most of the world's economies. As the global flows of capital dried up, the crash meant not just the loss of the sectors of the economy based on providing services for them but also those areas like construction based on the speculation made possible by the profits and wages they generated. The reforms afoot in the global financial architecture mean that these flows are likely to progressively lessen and even disappear in the coming years as tax-rates are harmonised and tax-havens are closed down. This makes it certain that the crash will hit the Irish economy far harder then it will hit many other economies.

2.3 The neoliberal strategy of giving workers tax cuts rather than wage increases during the 'social partnership' of the boom years relied on revenue from property transactions to continue to fund public services. The crash has mean not only the loss of the taxes on wages and profits from that sector but also the loss of those transaction taxes (VAT, stamp duty) etc creating a huge deficit in public finances. This deficit has in turn been used to justify the initial wave of attacks on public sector workers and cuts in public services.

2.4 In the private sector the reliance on a few massive global companies like Dell to generate significant sections of GDP and employment has meant that as those companies cut their Irish operations the knock on effect on employment is massive as apart from the direct employment up to 10 times the workforce were employed in suppliers and logistics operations serving those companies.

2.5 A huge sector of the workforce had come to be employed in construction including very large number of migrant workers. The size of the construction bubble is such that a huge surplus of housing exists, a surplus made worse by the drop in demand both due to three factors, the migration of many workers out of the country, the loss of jobs and wages that means housing has become even less affordable despite the drop in prices and the much greater difficulty in obtaining mortgages.

2.6 In the services sector a significant drop in demand flows out of the above as there are fewer people to buy stuff, disposable income has dropped for the rest of the population and easy credit to buy on tick has dried up.

2.7 In short every significant section of the working class is seeing a drop in wages, conditions and in most cases employment. This in turn means a drop in spending and in tax revenue leading to further difficulties for each sector.

The situation in Northern Ireland

2.8 The North is also facing similar effects due to the global recession. This is compounded by the fact that wages and cost of living are lower here than other parts of the UK. The recession has increased the gradual erosion of the manufacturing sector and impacted particularly on the construction industry. In the month of April, 2% of the sector was lost in four days with further job losses announced at Bombardier, Nortel and FG Wilson.

2.9 Since its inception, the northern state has accounted for around two thirds of economic output and employment. However, there has been a gradual shift from the state to the private sector due to ‘security normalisation’, and a Stormont administration which is wedded to neo-liberal privatisation polices such as Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) and Private Public Partnerships (PPPs).

Section 3 - Resistance to the crisis to date and what it tells us

3.1 It was of considerable significance that the first attack the Republic of Ireland government tried to launch in response to the crisis, the removal of the medical card from many retired people, quickly failed in reaction to the mobilisations against this attack. This demonstrated that even minor resistance could be successful and that the government was unprepared for opposition.

3.2 The reaction to this was a delay in rolling out further cuts and very considerable media preparation for the implementation of these cuts. In particular the campaign against public sector workers that went on for months before details of the pay cut were revealed. Likewise the reintroduction of university fees saw a months long media campaign. This media campaign has resulted in the majority of working class people accepting the notion that we must all 'share the pain', that we all 'lost the run of ourselves'/'lived beyond our means' during the boom. The extent of the divide that currently exists between public and private sector workers as a result of this media campaign should not be underestimated. It has become common parlance that we have a 'bloated' public sector and that public sector workers have a 'generous' pension entitlement which 'cannot be afforded'.

3.3 The decision to go ahead with the cuts without ICTU, therefore bringing two decades of social partnership to a temporary end, represented a hardening of state and employer preparation and a determination to face down the unions. To a very limited extent the employers retreated from that position to avoid the March 30 strike but ICTU got nothing in return except for the resumption of talks in the context where the public sector pay cut was a reality.

3.3 In the Republic of Ireland, social partnership provided a political cover for neo-liberal politics for the past 20 years. While the boom lasted it was possible for the trade union leadership to sell the idea that we were all 'in it together'. However the crash has made the selling of this notion much more difficult. The majority of the trade union leadership remain ideologically wedded to the concept of social partnership and take the view that by being part of 'partnership' they can ameliorate the worst effects of government policy. When the talks 'broke down' on 2nd February on the issue of the public sector pension levy, it emerged that it was ICTU leaders Peter McLoone and Dan Murphy who had proposed the pension levy to government as being 'more sellable' than a pay cut. ICTU's walkout from the talks allowed the government to announce and impose the levy supposedly outside of social partnership but within two months talks resumed with the levy firmly in place. It's clear that there has been a hardening of government and employer attitude towards the trade unions and that government would quite happily do away with social partnership at this time but the trade union leadership are desperately hanging on to the remnants of the 'partnership' idea.

3.4 The first months of the crisis impacting living conditions represented a period when there was a possibility of a sudden semi-spontaneous upsurge in struggle as a mass reaction to the speed at which hopes were dashed. The highpoints of that potential were the response to the withdrawal of the over-70s medical card, the series of large national demonstrations against education cuts, the occupation of their workplace by Waterford Crystal workers in reaction to its closure, the ICTU-organised 140,000 strong march on 21st February and the call for a national strike on 30th March. However it was clear that with their attachment to social partnership ICTU was never interested in properly organising for 30th March. This, combined with the massive media campaign referred to in 3.2 above, negated the potential for this struggle. ICTU was able to cancel March 30th without a whimper of protest (see section on state of the unions below). It made sense in this period for us to put a concentrated and sustained effort in to do the little we could to push that possibility as far as it goes. This can be compared with a sprint. That movement did not emerge, ICTU successfully canceled March 30 on the weakest of excuses with almost no reaction. We now need to shift to a strategy aimed at sustained activity in the months and years of the crisis to come.

Section 4 - the state of the left, anarchist and republican movement

4.1 In general we can say that no section of the left, including the anarchist movement, was in any way prepared for the crisis. Reaction to it has generally been too little, too late and lacking in direction.

4.2 The crisis has also revealed in stark terms that the great bulk of the working class is ideologically distant from the left. Although many people undoubtedly want a fairer, more just and more equal society, anti-capitalist alternatives have virtually zero credibility amongst the population. The exception to this is that a layer of trade union and NGO activists is emerging who are questioning the status quo and who provide an audience for anti-capitalist ideas

4.3 Hence, the crisis, rising unemployment, insecurity and falling wages have seen very little or no growth in support for anti-capitalist groups. Attempts to build broad left-wing networks of militants to oppose the attacks on workers' living standards have generally failed to attract anybody beyond the existing, tiny, far left.

4.4 WSM developed an analysis of what was happening to capitalism early in the crisis and have put considerable work into disseminating it.

4.5 We attempted to use the crisis to build resistance to the cuts, but, given the prevailing ideological climate, have met with very limited success. Much of this failure was due to an under-estimation on our part of the degree to which basic socialist ideas such as the importance of economic class, solidarity and the need for struggle have waned.

4.6 We now need to shift to a multi pronged approach aimed at preparing our membership for more effective intervention in community and workplace struggles on the one hand and on the other of creating a convincing model or models of an alternative to capitalism and a road map of getting to that alternative.

Section 5 - the state of the unions

5.1 The crisis has revealed for all to see how weak the unions have become at the grassroots level. A majority of WSM union members found themselves in situations where their local branches could not be called functional in any real sense. Our current position paper assumes a functioning union structure at the local level and is entirely based around this which meant that those members had little or no guidance about what they should be doing that could actually be implemented in the time frame.

5.2 The attempt to build a network of militants across public sector unions failed after a lack luster but not insignificant start at the meeting of public sector workers in the Davenport hotel. The cause of that failure is a mixture of only token involvement by the left and the undemocratic & bureaucratic informal organisation it started from and the high levels of dis-engagement with unions that exists even within unionised workplaces.

5.3 In terms of workplace organising we can identify three situations
a) Unionised workplaces where there is a reasonable level of rank & file activity. That is where people have contact with their union rep and there are general meetings to discuss issues of importance where workers can enter into debate with their fellow workers as a group.
b) Unionised workplaces where for whatever reason there is little or no rank and file activity as yet. In these cases the methods of involvement we advocate members carry out in the position paper may not be at all easy to implement in reality as they often presume such activity.
c) Unorganised workplaces where unions do not exist. Again there is a major hole in our existing position paper on the unions here probably because we have the expectation that recruitment is the work of the unions rather than revolutionaries. However the experience of unorganised members and contacts is that attempts to join unions frequently result in unanswered calls or letters and that even in unionised workplaces it is not that unusual for attempting to join taking long periods and requiring follow up calls.

5.4 In the last months members who found themselves in situation a) were in a position to implement policy in a way that influenced events and are relatively buoyed up from this experience. However members in situation b) and c) were in a very different situation and in some cases have been demoralised by the experience. Steps are being made to address this through a workplace dayschool but it seems obvious that at all levels, including policy making, we need to put much more focus on addressing these situations and developing a working strategy for members to implement.

5.5 This is a general description of where the Irish working class finds itself in relation to workplace organisation. We can hope that much of this will be resolved spontaneously as the crisis forces people to organise. It is clear that huge work is needed at grassroots level in terms of equipping people with the skills to go about 'workplace organising', part of our immediate role must be to move on from semi-rhetorical calls to 'organise your workplace' and push the concrete questions of how to organise up the agenda.

5.6 We should be prepared to investigate and explore all options in terms of workplace organising - working in existing unions where possible but looking to build alternative structures if and where necessary.

5.7 As part of this process we should be escalating our goals of building networks of libertarian workers by industry. The great increase in workplace activity means the possibility of doing this has been both increased and become something more achievable in the short to medium term. This does not mean it will be an easy process but it is one we can escalate.

Section 6 - community organisation & building resistance

6.1 In the community sector an early indication of the crisis was the collapse of the public private partnership redevelopment of run down public housing in Dublin. When the property crash removed the ability to make super profits through the part privatisation of the land this 'regeneration' was to happen on, the developer simply walked away. The attempts by the community sector to resist this were too small and too isolated to have any impact and soon fizzled out.

6.2 Many workers in the community sector are facing huge increases in workload due to rising poverty being created by job losses. At the same time their wages are being frozen or cut as a result of the pensions levy. Winning support for the March 30th strike proved particularly difficult in this sector due in part to the feeling of social responsibility felt by many workers and the fact that they are divided into very small work units where frequently the manager is in the same union (if not the union rep) as the rest of the workers.

6.3 With a massive number of people on the dole for the first time the issue of organising the unemployed needs to be seriously considered. The Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed was established in the 1980s as part of the process of 'incorporation' of resistance to the mass unemployment of the time. Like ICTU, it is ideologically wedded to 'social partnership'. It sees its role as being to influence government through lobbying and to deliver services to the unemployed. No meaningful or independent organisations of the unemployed will emerge from this source. New structures and organisations will need to be built as part of the process of organising the unemployed.

6.4 It is certain that cuts of community services including transportation will continue and there may be an attempt to raise additional revenue through additional service charges (a water tax seems likely) or property tax. In addition higher unemployment means more people who will be spending time where they live rather than where they work and for whom locally based services become very much more important. There may be a considerable increase in neighborhood organising opportunities of which the unemployed may be an important component.

6.5 Where we have a concentration of unemployed members we should target local dole offices for regular distribution of Workers Solidarity & other political activity. It may also make sense to look at holding other types of local activity including meetings & film showings in conjunction with this to start the construction of anti-authoritarian neighborhood groups that may over time be in a position to found neighborhood centers. After conference each branch/region will meet to identify if and where such an initiative may make sense.

Section 7 - the 'movement' & the 'organisation' - what do we try to build and where

7.1 Our attempts to use March 30 to build momentum within the wider anti-authoritarian movement failed to get an echo. The same can be said of our attempt to do the same at the Cork Grassroots Gathering back in the autumn and virtually all of our attempts to involve the movement in struggles that relate to practical and economic matters. All the anti-authoritarian material produced in relation to the crisis has been produced by the WSM and almost all the people circulating this material have been WSM members.

7.2 This is due to the fact that much of the movement was predicated on the strength of the capitalist economic system. It saw itself as a movement in resistance to the capitalist juggernaut. Much of its activity was focused on attempting to curb the system's worst excesses or of finding alternative spaces outside of, yet dependant upon, the system's strength. The movement is united in terms of opposing the current system and organising along anti-authoritarian lines. But it doesn't have an agreed vision of an alternative to the capitalist system.

7.3 The easy path, and perhaps the most effective, would be to abandon any real attempt to influence the anti-authoritarian movement and rely on our own resources and the few individuals who will help us in this work. This would have the advantage of freeing up time and resources for a more broad left approach. However we know from Mayday 2004 and the Shannon protests that a successful mobilization of the movement can have a much greater impact that that of our efforts alone.

7.4 Our challenge is to come up with a concrete economic alternative that appears plausible to people. As the crisis deepens and persists, objective circumstances will push more and more people to consider alternatives that lie outside of a capitalist framework. Our principle task in the coming months will be to develop and deepen our analysis of the crisis and to formulate alternative ways in which people can respond to it that appear plausible to ordinary people while setting them on an anti-capitalist trajectory.

7.5 We should produce analysis of the crisis which can talk to ordinary people and reflect the ways in which the crisis is impacting on their lives. This can best be done through 'Workers Solidarity' and through producing leaflets on specific aspects of the crisis e.g. education cuts/bus strike etc. We should also step up our use of mainstream media both through issuing of press statements and writing of 'letters to the editor'. We should publish our material as broadly as possible on the internet, as this will maintain our visibility and allow us to take advantage of any turns towards radicalisation amongst the masses.

7.6 In tandem with this we should where possible get involved in agitational/fighting back initiatives. Our capacity for kicking off such initiatives ourselves is limited but where particular groups of workers or members of particular communities do take action, we should provide whatever support we can and should attempt to influence/encourage such initiatives towards anti-authoritarian/anarchist politics.

7.7 We should also realise however that we have a very limited capacity for influencing the mass of the working class. We should therefore focus more heavily on
a) Developing a more detailed plan as to how we could get from this society to the society that we propose. In particular, we need to provide a realistic and plausible answer to "what do we do once we've occupied the factory".
b) Disseminating these ideas to as wide an audience as possible, with particular focus on persuading people in a position to be ideologically influential if and when the crisis reaches such a stage where mass resistance breaks out.
c) Attempting to position ourselves in our communities, workplaces and unions in such a way so as that when and if mass resistance breaks out, we and our ideas are already known and respected

7.8 One major weakness we face is our very limited ability to rapidly communicate with large number of people, in particular when it comes to making detailed arguments. In that context it would make sense for us to re-engage with indymedia.ie as an existing outlet that has a readership of 100,000 per week with a max of 10k reading a particular article in a month in comparison with a readership of 3,000 per week with a max of 600 reading a particular article in a month for the WSM site. It is essential that a high traffic single activists news site exists over the next two or three years. Until we can be sure of successful creation of an alternative we need to ensure the survival of indymedia.

7.9 We will continue to build the WSM website and communication resources. Branches are encouraged to put 'article writing' on their weekly agenda and ensure that at least one member writes a 'personal opinion' piece each week. This should first be published to indymedia.ie. The editorial group will ensure articles are republished on the WSM site and that a weekly listing of new articles is sent to the WSM announcement list and social networking resources. Branches are strongly encouraged to collect email addressees at any event they are organising or at stalls etc and ensure they addresses are added to Ainriail, the WSM announcement list.

7.10 Workers Solidarity and Ideas & Action both have an essential role to play in this work. At the moment the WS editorial group can choose to produce up to 20,000 of any issue and must produce 6 a year. This limit will be upped to 30,000 and the committee is encouraged to consider this volume in the event of major demonstrations, strikes or other struggles emerging. At times of crisis the committee is also encouraged to move to a monthly production and then pull back to bi-monthly in quieter periods.

7.11 Unbranded stickers will be produced and distributed in large quantities that will be generally identifiable, as anarchist and which will highlight key slogans along the lines of the 'They didn't share the wealth, why should we share the pain'. 800 euro will be allocated to the purchase of a color lazer printer to enable rapid and constant production of such 'silent agitators' on demand for branches.

Section 8 - the possibility of turning resistance into revolution

8.1 The depth of the crisis remains uncertain but nevertheless the attacks that the bosses need to launch on the working class to get capitalism in Ireland back on the road to recovery are massive. Already many workers have not only faced pay cuts and job losses but have seen their net worth wiped out as house prices crashed, plunging many into negative equity. There is a possibility that the depth of the cuts themselves will force workers to take radical action as the most logical solution to the problems the crisis creates for them. We have already seen that in the Waterford Glass and Visteon workplace occupations.

8.2 Important in the process will be the production of convincing model(s) of an alternative society and how we might reach it. A number of members are already working on this, at the end of conference we will form a working group from a few such members to produce a collective draft that can be brought to a special conference of the WSM for agreement by September. As well as agreeing that draft this special conference will draw up plans to produce and distribute it through publications, meetings etc.

8.3 The question of putting revolution on the agenda can then be considered to have two components. Both are essential. The first is the spread of militant direct action as a way of tackling and even solving immediate problems. The second is the spreading of the idea that there is a viable alternative to capitalism that can be achieved and that this achievement is of such a value as to be worth the inevitable risks involved. Either or both of these things could happen quite quickly, over months, or they may not happen at all. Our task is to identify the points at which our input into either and both processes can be most effective.

8.4 This question cannot be divorced from the question of organisational growth. The heightened activity of the Feb-March 2009 period saw us very quickly run up against the limitations of our current size. This is not a question that can be answered through either qualitative improvement / training or through greater effort of individual members although both are of course relevant. If the crisis generates a revolutionary situation we need to enter that period with a membership in the low thousands as an absolute minimum or as part of an organised anti-authoritarian alliance of organisations of a similar level of organisation and resources as our own with somewhat greater numbers.

Passed at April 2009 WSM National Conference